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H  I  G  H  L  I G  H T S 
► We test four explanations of selective exposure (SE) to confirming information.
► Information seeking was measured following predictions of varying arbitrariness.
► Participants engaged in SE following arbitrary and informed predictions.
► Anticipated positive affective reactions predicted information selections.
► The positive affect associated with being correct can drive post-prediction SE.
A b  s  t  r  a  c  t 
Five studies tested when and why individuals engage in confirmatory information searches (selective expo- 
sure) following predictions. Participants engaged in selective exposure following their own predictions, even 
when their predictions were completely arbitrary (Studies 1 and 3). The selective exposure was not simply 
the result of a cognitive bias tied to the salience of a prediction option (Study 2). Instead, it appears that 
making a prediction—regardless of how ill-informed a person is while making the prediction—can cause the 
per- son to anticipate enjoyment from being right (Studies 4 and 5) and to select new information consistent 
with that outcome. The results establish a desirability account that can explain post-prediction selective 
exposure effects even in cases when defense motivations, pre-existing differences, or positive-test 
strategies can be ruled out as explanations. 
Introduction 
People frequently make predictions about outcomes in various do- 
mains (e.g., business, sports, politics). By definition, people making pre- 
dictions do not have complete knowledge and therefore cannot be 
certain of the outcome. Often, additional information that is potentially 
relevant to the prediction becomes available after the prediction is 
made but before the true outcome is learned. How people attend to 
and use this additional information is important because new 
information can shape confidence in one's prediction (Windschitl, 
Scherer, Smith, & Rose, 2012) and influence subsequent decision-
making (e.g., Kray & Galinsky, 2003). 
Research on post-choice information selection has shown that 
after making a choice between options—say Vacation A and Vacation 
B—people prefer to read information that supports their choice rather 
than conflicts with it (for reviews see Hart et al., 2009; Jonas, 
Schulz-Hardt, Fischer, & Frey, 2006; Smith, Fabrigar, & Norris, 2008). 
Recent work from our lab revealed a related result for post-prediction 
information selection. That is, after having made a prediction about 
which of two outcomes/answers is correct, participants tended to 
select additional information that supported rather than conflicted 
with their prediction (Windschitl et al., 2012). 
The studies in the present paper address the questions of when 
and why people exhibit a post-prediction information selection bias. 
Regarding the when question, we tested whether the amount of 
information that people have at the point of making a prediction 
moderates the extent to which they exhibit a bias in their post-
prediction information selections. In an extreme case, we tested 
whether a purely arbitrary prediction triggers selective exposure. 
We believe that it is both interesting and important to examine how 
even highly arbitrary predictions might trigger a bias in 
subsequent information processing. People often appear to be 
willing to offer speculative predictions about events for which they 
know next to nothing, and we suspect they do this with the 
comfort of knowing it is “just a prediction” or “just a guess.” Yet, it 
is possible that even with arbitrary predictions, the act of picking 
one outcome rather than another 
 
(or others) could trigger changes in how subsequent information is 
searched and used. 
By varying level-of-information and other task variables, our studies 
also provide answers to the why question. This paper discusses four 
main accounts for why people might exhibit a post-prediction selection 
bias. While all of these accounts are plausible under general conditions, 
they differ in what they posit regarding selection biases after people 
have made purely arbitrary predictions (and under other conditions 
that we explore). 
Before discussing the particular accounts, we wish to comment on 
the relationship between information selection following choice 
(about which there is a large literature) and prediction. A prediction 
between possible outcomes is a type of choice, so there is clearly a 
degree of conceptual overlap for understanding post-choice and 
post-prediction information selection. This overlap is reflected in the 
discussion of accounts below. However, we note that the post- 
prediction context is importantly distinct from the general case of 
choice, because it involves uncertainty about an objectively correct 
answer. When a person searches for additional information after a 
prediction, there is an objective reality looming. That is, the person 
will learn that they made the right or wrong prediction, and this 
ultimate determination is not flexible. Biased information searching 
after a prediction cannot change whether the prediction is right or 
wrong. Alternatively, biased searching after other types of choices has 
the potential to shape the determination/evaluation of the outcome 
(e.g., finding additional fun things to do at the chosen rather than 
rejected vacation destination can lead one to conclude that a good 
choice was made). In short, it seems important to directly study post-
prediction information selection, rather than merely assuming it is 
fully understood through studies that involve other forms of choice.1 
 
 
Four accounts 
 
Defense motivation 
 
The defense-motivation account incorporates ideas from cognitive 
dissonance and related theories of defense motivation (Chen & 
Chaiken, 1999; Jonas et al., 2006) and is the primary account offered 
for post-choice selective exposure (Hart et al., 2009). Applied to a 
case of a non-arbitrary prediction, the account would posit that 
individuals engage in selective exposure as a means of 
reducing or avoiding concern that they might be wrong. After 
evaluating all avail- able information and making a prediction, 
reading new information that conflicts with one's prediction could 
arouse dissonance or other negative affective responses, so that 
information is avoided.2 
Whereas defense motivation could be compelling as an account 
for non-arbitrary predictions, what about entirely arbitrary 
predictions? Cognitive dissonance theory and various empirical 
findings suggest that when a strong external justification for a 
dissonance- provoking action is available, the justification is 
readily used to dif- fuse or avoid such dissonance (e.g., Festinger 
& Carlsmith, 1959; Joule & Azdia, 2003). Therefore, a defense 
motivation account might 
 
 
 
1 
A reviewer noted that previous studies have involved information selection follow- 
ing choices that could be characterized as somewhat arbitrary. We agree, but wish to 
note that our paradigm investigates arbitrary predictions in a way that other post- 
choice paradigms have not. Commonly used post-choice selective exposure paradigms, 
such as one in which respondents decide whether the contract of “Mr. Miller” should 
be extended, (Frey, 1981), are explicitly hypothetical and have no objectively correct 
response (see also Fischer, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2008). Additionally, unlike the arbi- 
trary predictions we solicit in some of our studies, participants in those post-choice 
paradigms are given substantial (albeit not definitive) information on which to make 
their initial choice. 
2  
People might also process decision-inconsistent information in a defensive manner 
or assume the decision-inconsistent information is of low quality, which could fuel se- 
lective exposure effects (e.g., Fischer, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2008). 
suggest an absence of selective exposure after arbitrary predictions. 
More specifically, people would not feel threatened by disconfirming 
information, because they have a compelling justification for being 
wrong—the lack of information forced them to simply guess. Also, 
defense theorists often assume that commitment to a decision is 
important before dissonance triggers compensatory effects (Hart 
et al., 2009), but with an entirely arbitrary prediction, people 
would likely have little sense of commitment to a prediction. 
Nevertheless, in principle, one could argue that even after an entirely 
arbitrary prediction, people have a sense of concern or perhaps just a 
negative affective reaction when encountering information suggesting 
they might be wrong, motivating people to be biased in the information 
they select after the prediction. In short, whereas a classic interpretation 
of dissonance theory might suggest no selective exposure after arbitrary 
predictions, there are interpretations of what might still be called 
dissonance or defense accounts that could be used to explain the 
existence of selective exposure after even an arbitrary prediction. 
 
Pre-existing differences 
 
The pre-existing differences account posits a much different 
explanation. It starts with the assumption that, even at the start of 
a study, participants vary in their pre-existing beliefs, attitudes, and 
preferences. It further posits that participants' predictions and 
information selections within the study covary as a function of these 
pre-existing differences. Critically, then, this account suggests that 
making a prediction does not cause individuals to engage in selective 
exposure. Instead, selective-exposure effects (and predictions) are 
driven by pre-existing beliefs, attitudes, and/or preferences. For 
example, a person who likes mountains more than oceans might be 
more likely to predict that Colorado is rated as a more beautiful 
state than Florida and find information that highlights the natural 
beauty of Colorado's mountains more interesting and informative than 
information that highlights the natural beauty of Florida's beaches. 
Predicting Colorado would not cause the person to engage in 
selective exposure for Colorado, the person's existing preference 
would determine the prediction and information selection. The pre-
existing differences account shares fea- tures with Chen and Risen's 
(2010) recent critique of cognitive disso- nance explanations of 
spreading-of-alternatives effects, with Sears and Freedman's 
(1967) notion of de facto selective exposure, and with a biased-
evaluation process described by Fischer, Jonas, Frey, and Schulz-
Hardt (2005). The account is an important one because it chal- lenges 
the routinely accepted idea that the choice process truly triggers post-
choice selective exposure. 
Whereas pre-existing differences could account for selective 
exposure that coincides with a non-arbitrary prediction, what about 
cases involving entirely arbitrary predictions? If the prediction is so 
arbitrary as to be essentially random (see Study 1), this means there 
is no systematic link between predictions and pre-existing 
differences or information selections. Consequently, the pre-existing 
differences account could not account for observed selective 
exposure effects after fully arbitrary predictions. 
 
Positive-testing 
 
The positive-test account posits that post-prediction selection 
biases reflect a generic cognitive strategy. This account is related to 
the positive-test strategy for hypothesis testing (see Klayman & Ha, 
1987; Snyder & Swann, 1978). The account suggests that, after people 
make a prediction and while they are assessing whether their 
prediction was correct, they check on evidence that is consistent 
with it being correct (i.e., confirming evidence). As a generic 
process, this tendency/strategy to check on confirming evidence 
does not reflect nor is fueled by a motivation to be correct; it 
would presumably be applied to testing any focal hypothesis. 
Consequently, even if person's prediction was entirely arbitrary, this 
account still predicts that they 
 
would check on evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that 
their prediction is correct. 
 
Desirability 
 
Finally, we introduce the desirability account. Without this ac- 
count, it would be difficult to explain the full set of findings reported 
in this paper. The account assumes that people hope that they are 
right in their predictions. Because being right is affectively rewarding, 
finding information that suggests one might be right is also affectively 
rewarding, and this can cause people to select confirming information 
over disconfirming information. We believe that, even when a 
prediction is entirely arbitrary, people still hope to be right. We 
suspect that readers can recall personal experiences of feeling or 
witnessing satisfaction following a correct guess about the 
outcome of a purely chance event—even when the outcome itself 
was mundane, such as accurately predicting the outcome of a coin 
flip. In short, we propose that even after an arbitrary prediction, 
people's desire to be right can shape their affective responses to, and 
selection of, information. 
 
Paradigm/overview 
 
Again, our aim was to investigate when and why people exhibit 
post-prediction selection biases. The paradigm we used involved 
soliciting a prediction from participants (about artworks) and then 
giving them an opportunity to select pieces of information that either 
supported or conflicted with that prediction. All four accounts 
discussed above offer plausible explanations for selection biases 
following well-informed predictions (i.e., predictions from 
participants who had a full view of the artworks). Yet, the accounts 
differ regarding what would happen after arbitrary or uniformed 
predictions (i.e., predictions made without any view of the 
artworks). 
 
Study 1 
 
Study 1 tested how reductions in the amount of information that 
individuals had while making a prediction influenced the magnitude 
of the post-prediction selection bias. There were three possible levels 
of information—full, partial, and none (operationalized by whether 
they had a full, partial, or no view of the artwork when making 
their predictions). We also crossed this with an instruction 
manipulation that proved inconsequential (see below). 
As a reminder, all four accounts anticipate that individuals would 
exhibit a post-prediction selection bias when making a fully informed 
prediction. However, when there is no information on which a person 
can base a prediction, the pre-existing differences account predicts an 
elimination of the selection bias, the defense-motivation account is 
not definitive on the matter, and positive-test and desirability ac- 
counts both anticipate selective exposure effects. 
 
Participants and design 
 
The participants for our studies (N = 41 for Study 1) were 
University of Iowa students from an introductory psychology course. 
The de- sign was a 2 (extra instructions: yes, no)× 3 (view: full, 
partial, no view)× 3 (artwork type: painting, sculpture, photograph) 
mixed factorial, with the last two factors manipulated within-
subject. 
 
Materials and procedure 
more college students nationwide. In the full-view condition, 
participants were given a full view of the artworks. In the partial-view 
condition, participants made their predictions from largely 
monochromatic color samples from the two artworks. In the no-view 
condition, participants made their prediction without seeing the 
artworks or any labels revealing characteristics of the artworks; they 
simply selected a box labeled “A” or a box labeled “B” on the screen 
where the artworks would otherwise appear (see Fig. 1). In the 
partial-view and no-view conditions, participants were informed that 
although they could not see the full artworks when making 
predictions, the nationwide sample of college students always had a 
full view of the artworks. After each prediction, all participants were 
always given full views of both artworks (which appeared in 
counterbalanced locations) in a pair. 
Next, participants were presented with an information buffet—i.e., 
eight titles to comments purportedly written by other University of 
Iowa students. Each title foreshadowed a positive or negative evalua- 
tion of one of the artworks (e.g., “Mountain Photo is a well detailed 
photo.”). A buffet always contained two positive and two negative ti- 
tles towards each of the two artworks, and the titles were randomly 
ordered. Participants were told to select three to seven titles of the 
comments that they would like to read later (in their full form).3 All 
of these procedures were repeated for a total of three artwork pairs. 
Participants also indicated their confidence in their prediction— 
once after the information buffet and once after reading the selected 
comments. While confidence was measured in our studies (except 
Study 4), it is not of primary interest in this paper, and will not be 
discussed further (but see Tables S1 and S2 in the online supplemen-
tary materials). 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
We indexed the selection bias by computing the proportion of titles 
a participant selected from a buffet that were consistent with his or her 
prediction (i.e., positive towards the selected artwork or negative to- 
wards the non-selected artwork).4 Therefore, values significantly 
greater than 50% indicate a bias towards selecting confirming 
information. The grand mean on this index was 67.3% (SD = 19.9%), 
representing a 
significant selection bias, t(40)= 5.55, p .001. Artwork type (painting, 
sculpture, or photo) and the extra instructions had no reliable effects. 
More important was whether there was a significant selection bias 
in each view condition. Contrary to what the pre-existing differences 
account predicted, there was no main effect of view, F(2,28)=.734, 
p =.49. In fact, participants demonstrated a significant selection bias 
regardless of whether their predictions were based on a full (M = 
71%, 
SD =30.1%), t(40)= 4.46, p .001, partial (M = 68.2%, SD =33.4%), 
t(40)= 3.49, p .001, or no view of the artworks (M =62.6%, SD = 
27.5%), t(40)= 2.93, p .01 (see Fig. 2). 
The effect in the no-view condition is especially interesting and 
important. It reveals that even when individuals make an entirely 
arbitrary prediction, they still engage in selective exposure. We 
verified this result in a follow-up study in which participants 
(N= 35) 
made all three predictions under a no-view condition. The average se- 
lection bias (61.8%) was again significant (p .01). This follow-up 
study also included a measure that helps rule out some conceptually 
plausible alternative mechanisms mentioned by a reviewer: that 
participants selected confirming information about the predicted 
art- work because they came to like that artwork after learning 
they had predicted it (Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007; 
Rydell & Gawronski, 2009). After the main task, participants 
indicated how
Participants were told that they would be making predictions about    
the aesthetic preferences of college students under conditions of 
uncertainty. Participants in the extra instructions condition were 
explicitly informed that they would find out whether their 
predictions were right or wrong. All participants then saw their first 
artwork pair and made predictions regarding which of the artworks 
was preferred by 
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Fig. 1. Black and white screenshot of the prediction phase for a no-view condition in Study 1. 
 
 
 
much they liked each artwork. There were no significant differences 
between ratings of artworks that did and did not appear as the 
participants' arbitrary prediction (which again were randomly 
determined by the computer), ruling out this alternative 
explanation. 
With the results of Study 1 and the follow-up, we can rule out the 
pre-existing differences account. Recall that the account would 
suggest that selective exposure occurs because people's pre-
existing preferences, beliefs, or attitudes relevant to the two 
artworks would drive both their predictions and their information 
selections, not be- cause predictions somehow drive information 
selections. However, in the no-view condition, predictions were 
formally random (i.e., participants predicted artwork “A” or “B” 
without seeing them, and then saw what they had “picked,” which 
was randomly determined). In other words, pre-existing 
differences could not have affected which artwork they 
“predicted.”5 This finding is important because it means that the 
act of predicting an artwork did indeed trigger (i.e., have a causal 
impact on) selective exposure. 
All of the other three accounts we discussed (defense motivation, 
positive-test, and desirability) could account for the observed pat- 
terns of selective exposure. 
 
 
Study 2 
 
would anticipate that a selection bias would not be triggered if people 
were simply given a prediction to consider. 
Study 2 used procedures essentially identical to the full-view 
condition of Study 1, except for one key difference. When 
participants initially viewed an artwork pair, no predictions were 
solicited. In- stead, the computer randomly selected one of the 
two artworks by placing a red box around it. Participants (N = 
70) were told that they would soon judge the likelihood that the 
selected artwork was the one that was preferred by college students 
nationwide. If participants were simply employing a positive-test 
strategy, they should check on information consistent with that 
possibility. 
The average selection bias was only 52.6% (SD = 17.3), which was 
not significantly different from 50%, t(69)= 1.23, p =.22. None of the 
selection biases for the individual artwork pairs approached 
significance (all t's 1.2). This result is inconsistent with the 
positive-test 
account, yet if fits with expectations from the defense-motivation 
and desirability accounts. 
 
 
 
80 
 
70 
 
Study 2 is important for evaluating the positive-test account as an 60 
explanation for the observed findings. This account suggests that the se- 
lection bias reflects a generic, non-motivated strategy that people apply 50 
when testing any hypothesis or prediction. Therefore, the account predicts that if  
people were given a prediction to consider—rather than 40 
asked to generate the prediction themselves—they would exhibit the 
same selection biases as seen in Study 1. Since the defense-motivation
 30
 
and desirability accounts both assume that people have some motivated stake in 
whether their prediction was wrong/right, both accounts 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
Full-view 
Partial-view 
No-view 
 
10 
 
 
 
5 
Participants might have had other pre-existing tendencies, such as a tendency to 
pick “A” rather than “B.” However, this tendency would not, a priori, be linked to a ten- 
dency to favor positive information about a particular artwork (e.g., a mountain photo) 
or information about that artwork. 
0 
Condition 
 
Fig. 2. Selection bias for each of the viewing conditions in Study 1. Values significantly 
greater than 50% indicate a bias towards confirming information. Error bars represent SE. 
 
Study 3 
 
There is an alternative version of the positive-test account that could 
still be viable after Study 2. Perhaps after a person makes a prediction, 
there is a stronger focus on “could it be right?” rather than “could it 
be wrong?” (Gilovich, 1991; Hoch, 1985; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & 
Fischhoff, 1980). This differential focus could, in part, be fueled by the 
fact that, while making the prediction, there is naturally a focus on 
making the right prediction. While this tendency might carry over 
from a prediction generation process, it is obviously not present when 
the pre- diction is provided rather than generated (as in Study 2). To 
test this version of the positive-test account, we implemented a 
manipulation that would break any mindset tendencies to focus 
primarily on “could it be right?” Specifically, half of the participants 
knew they would indicate the likelihood that their prediction was 
wrong. 
The design was a 2 (expected likelihood question: Were you right?, 
Were you wrong?) × 3 (view: full, partial, no view) × 3 (artwork type) 
mixed factorial. The procedures were identical to those from Study 1, 
except as follows. After their prediction, participants in the “Were you 
wrong?” (“Were you right?”) group were instructed: “Soon you will be 
asked to indicate the likelihood that your prediction is incorrect (correct). 
In other words, you will judge the probability that you were wrong 
(right) in your prediction.” Participants then selected information from 
the information buffet—which included another reminder that they 
would be asked to indicate the likelihood they were wrong (right) in 
their prediction. Finally, they made their likelihood judgment. As in 
Study 1, this series was repeated (through the three artwork types). 
See Fig. 3 for the main findings. The selection biases did not mean- 
ingfully vary as a function of view, artwork type, or interactions, so 
we focus here on the results for the new manipulation. Contrary to 
the positive-test account, the selection biases were not significantly 
different between the “Were you right?” (n = 33) and “Were you 
wrong?” (n= 33) groups, F 1. The average selection biases were 
66.6% (SD = 21.5%) and 66.2% (SD = 18.9%) respectively, and both 
were greater than 50% (ps .001). 
One might question whether participants in the “Were you wrong?” 
condition really recognized that they would be indicating the probabil- 
ity that they were wrong. The likelihood results indicate that partici- 
pants did attend to the question wording. The mean likelihood 
estimates of participants in the “Were you right?” and “Were you 
wrong?”  conditions  were  60.2  (SD = 10.2)  and  43.4  (SD = 13.5), 
reflecting a clear difference in focus, t(64)= 5.72, p .001. We also did 
a separate analysis of the selection bias for the second and third 
rounds—after participants had already provided a likelihood judgment 
(about being right or wrong) in the first rounds. Even within these 
rounds, the selection biases for the “Were you right?” (M= 65.6%; 
SD = 26.5) and “Were you wrong?” (M= 68.7%; SD =22.5) groups 
 
 
 
 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 "Were you right?" 
were both significant (ps .001). In other words, even participants 
who anticipated having to judge the likelihood that they were wrong 
(and had done so on the previous round) still preferred to read buffet 
information that suggested they were right. This result does not bode 
well for a positive-test account, but it is consistent with both the 
defense-motivation and a desirability accounts. 
 
Study 4 
 
The defense-motivation and desirability accounts are both 
motivated accounts, and some readers may question whether they are 
distinguishable. This presents a key question: Within the context 
of post-prediction information selections, is hoping to be right 
meaning- fully different from worrying about being wrong? 
Although other areas of psychology have drawn distinctions 
between constructs such as promotion and prevention (Higgins, 
1998; Molden, Lee, & Higgins, 2008) or gain and loss framing 
(Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; for 
discussion of related distinctions see Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003; 
Larsen, Berntson, Poehlmann, Ito, & Cacioppo, 2008), a similar 
distinction has not gained traction in explanations of post-choice 
selective exposure. The literature focuses primarily on how the 
potential for defense motivation shapes information selection (Hart 
et al., 2009). There is little reason to question the important role of 
defense motivation concerns in many selective-exposure effects. 
However, in the next two studies, we looked for initial evidence 
that, among participants making predictions, their hope to be 
right is not negligible, and it does indeed play a role in 
information selection. 
In Study 4, we examined two key issues. First, are participants actual- 
ly interested in being right, even about strictly arbitrary predictions? Sec- 
ond, is an interest in being right distinct and greater than a concern about 
being wrong? Participants (N = 60) indicated how they would feel upon 
learning their prediction was right or wrong. More specifically, after 
making a prediction about an artwork pair (same pairs as Study 1 
under full, partial, or no-view conditions), participants faced two 
questions in a counterbalanced order. One asked how good they would 
feel if their prediction was right (0 = Wouldn't Care, 100 = Would Feel 
Pretty Good) and one asked how bad they would feel if their 
prediction was wrong (0 = Wouldn't Care, 100 = Would Feel Pretty 
Bad). We recognize that interpreting differences on these two scales 
must be done with great caution. However, the empirical results were 
strong enough to assuage major concerns. 
Responses were similar across the three view conditions (see Table 1). 
The average response on the “If right” question was 60.0 (SD = 25.8), 
which is far from the Wouldn't Care anchor and confirms that participants 
had a notable interest in being right. The average response to the “If 
wrong” question was only 24.4 (SD = 17.0). Hence, participants were 
more interested in being right than they were concerned about being 
wrong, t(59) = 10.55, p .001. Importantly, this was true even when par- 
ticipants made an arbitrary prediction with no useful information. 
While individuals in this study showed some concern about being 
wrong, indicating that there may have been a small amount of 
defense motivation, this concern was clearly dwarfed by individuals' 
 
Table 1 
Anticipated positive and negative affect by view condition in Study 4. 
"Were you wrong?"    
30 
20 
10 
0 
Full-view Partial-view No-view 
View condition How good would 
you feel if your 
prediction was 
correct? 
How bad would you 
feel if your 
prediction was 
incorrect? 
 
Fig. 3. Selection bias for each of the viewing conditions and “Were you right/wrong?” 
conditions in Study 3. All selection bias measures were significantly greater than 50%. 
Error bars represent SE. 
 
 
 
Note: 0 = “Wouldn't Care” and 100 = “Would Feel Pretty Good/Bad”. 
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 M SD  M SD  
Full-view 60.2 26.2  24.9 18.5  
Partial-view 62.0 27.3  24.0 18.9  
No-view 57.8 28.8  24.3 21.2  
 
 
interest in being right, suggesting that desirability was the primary 
motivation. These results lend initial support to the notion that hop- 
ing to be right could be important for post-prediction information se- 
lection, and they suggest that the desirability account should not 
necessarily be subsumed by a defense motivation account. 
 
Study 5 
 
In Study 5, we delved deeper into the role of anticipated affective 
reactions to new, post-prediction information. The desirability account 
suggests that anticipated affective reactions to buffet comments should 
differ for confirmatory and disconfirmatory comments, and these antici- 
pated reactions should thereby influence buffet selections. The proce- 
dures for Study 5 were nearly identical to the partial-view condition of 
Study 1—with one key addition. Immediately following their prediction, 
participants (N = 29) sequentially viewed the comment titles that 
would soon appear on the information buffet. For each title, participants 
indicated their anticipation of how they would feel if they read the full 
comment (from −5 = Extremely Bad to +5 = Extremely Good). Next, 
participants saw the buffet and made their selections—this time with 
no restrictions on amount. 
Participants selected an average  of  2.56  items,  and  we  again 
observed a significant selection bias (M = 58.9%, SD = 22.1%, t(28)= 
2.16, p .05). More critical, however, are the findings involving the 
anticipated-affect measures. First, participants reported higher antici- 
pated affect for comments that, given their prediction, were confirma- 
tory (M =1.01, SD = 1.26) rather than disconfirmatory (M = − 0.32, 
SD =1.29), t(28)= 3.21, p .01. The former mean is significantly greater 
than zero (p .01), whereas the latter mean is not significantly different 
from zero (p =.17). In other words, participants clearly anticipated 
feeling good about reading information that supported their 
prediction (even though their prediction was based on almost no 
information), whereas their anticipated reactions to disconfirming 
information were less strong if not neutral. 
Second, participants' anticipated-affect ratings were predictive of 
what items they selected from the buffet. To determine this, we 
calculated idiographic correlations (separately within each buffet 
and per- son) between how the eight buffet titles were rated for 
anticipated affect and whether they were selected for reading. The 
overall aver- age of these correlations was .26, which was 
significantly greater 
than zero, t(28)= 4.49, p .001. 
Additional idiographic correlations between selection biases and rat- 
ings of the anticipated affect for confirmatory comments revealed that 
participants tended to exhibit larger selection biases on the rounds for 
which their average anticipated affect from reading those confirmatory 
comments was high (Mr =.32, t(21) = 2.15, p .05). However, 
comparable analyses involving anticipated affect for disconfirmatory 
comments were not significant (Mr = −.05, t(21) = 0.37, p =.71). In 
other words, participants' anticipations of how they would feel about 
confirmatory 
comments were predictive of selection biases, whereas participants' 
anticipations of how they would feel about disconfirmatory 
comments were not predictive. 
Between the defense-motivation account and the desirability account, 
the results of Study 5 lend clearer support for the latter. Again, we are not 
claiming the defense motivations are unimportant for selective exposure, 
but we do believe the results lend notable support to the notion that hop- 
ing to be right can be important for post-prediction information selection. 
 
General discussion 
 
The current studies suggest two novel and important conclusions. 
First, participants are often biased in their post-prediction information 
selections, even when their predictions are entirely arbitrary and 
made with no real information. Second, the selection biases that follow 
such arbitrary predictions may best be attributed to a desirability 
account—people hope to be right and favor supportive information 
even if their prediction is based on little or no information. 
The idea that a desire to be right would shape post-prediction 
selective exposure might not seem surprising given work on related 
issues (see Kunda, 1990). However, desire has not been explicitly 
identified as a major factor in selective exposure research. The 
defense-motivation account has largely dominated that literature 
(Hart et al., 2009), with some alternatives receiving limited attention 
(Klayman & Ha, 1987; Sears & Freedman, 1967). We note that some 
findings from post-choice selective-exposure studies might be better 
understood if a desirability account is considered. For example, 
research on framing effects and selective exposure has demonstrated 
that gain frames, where individuals might be focused on the desirability 
of outcomes, leads to selective exposure, while loss frames, which tend 
to elicit increased concern about being wrong, lead to a reduction or 
elimination of selective exposure (Fischer, Jonas, Frey, & Kastenmüller, 
2008; Kastenmüller et al., 2010). 
It is important to highlight that we tested cases in which, prior to a 
prediction, the possible outcomes themselves are hedonically neutral. 
That is, participants initially did not have a stake in whether one or the 
other artwork was the true answer. This allowed us to test the impact 
of a desire that arose once the prediction was made (i.e., the desire to 
be correct). In some contexts, people make predictions about outcomes 
that already have a hedonic value (e.g., whether one will be hired or 
not; whether a skin abnormality is cancerous or not). In these cases a de- 
sire to be correct in one's prediction is likely to be overshadowed by the 
desirability or undesirability of the outcomes themselves. 
We do not think that the desirability account uniformly explains 
all post-predictive selective exposure effects. There are a variety of 
potential moderators for post-prediction selective exposure—both in 
terms of magnitude of the effects as well as what accounts are most 
applicable. The post-choice literature provides some guidance as to 
what might be the most likely moderators. For example, increased 
accountability for a prediction might shift an individual's focus to a 
concern about being wrong and result in increased selective 
exposure (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2005). Future research 
should examine under what contexts the primary mechanisms of 
selective exposure might shift from one type (e.g., desirability) to 
another (e.g., defense motivation). 
Our findings have implications for the recent debate regarding 
classic post-choice effects in which chosen options appear to become 
increasingly favored and unchosen options increasingly disparaged 
(e.g., Chen & Risen, 2010; Sagarin & Skowronski, 2009). These effects 
are often assumed to be triggered by a motivation to avoid dissonance 
about a bad choice. However, Chen and Risen contend that better 
measurement of people's a priori preferences reveals that those 
preferences influence both choices and post-choice evaluations, 
which is critically different from assuming that choices trigger 
changes in evaluations (because of dissonance concerns). We find 
merit in their critique of the existing literature. However, we also 
note that we have ruled out the possibility that pre-existing 
differences could account for selection biases after arbitrary 
predictions. The biases, therefore, provide a clear example that 
choices (or predictions) can play a causal role in post-choice 
responses. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Receiving new information after a prediction should give us a chance 
to correct an errant prediction or at least begin to doubt it. However, 
when there is an assortment of new information available, we are likely 
to attend to the information that supports our prediction rather than in- 
formation that might help correct it. Apparently, it does not take much of 
a commitment to an initial prediction in order to trigger this bias. In sum, 
whether a prediction is a completely uninformed guess about the 
weather or a well-informed forecast about a political outcome, there is a 
danger 
than our “hope to be right” might squelch our chance to learn we were 
wrong. 
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